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Baby Doe's New Guardians: Federal
Policy Brings Nontreatment Decisions
Out of Hiding
Nor have we studied and perfected the means by which govern-
ment may be put at the service of humanity, in safeguarding the
health of the Nation, the health of its men and its women and
its children, as well as their rights in the struggle for existence.
This is no sentimental duty. The firm basis of government is
justice, not pity. These are matters of justice.
INTRODUCTION
The death of a six-day-old infant in April 19822 was the
catalyst for a society-wide controversy over decisions regard-
ing the fate of severely compromised newborns. The "Baby
Doe" 3 controversy generated a great deal of philosophical,"
I T.W. Wilson, First Inaugural Address, (March 4, 1913), quoted in UNESCO &
UNIPUB, INc., BIRTHRIGHT OF MAN 357 (1969).
1 The baby is known as "Infant Doe" to preserve anonymity of the family. See
Comment, Baby Doe Decisions: Modern Society's Sins of Omission, 63 NEB. L. Rv.
888, 889 n.2 (1984).
1 "Baby Doe" refers to any severely compromised infant with birth defects. See
id. at 899. "The child called 'Baby Doe' has lent his name to all babies whose lives are
similarly at stake." Id.
4 Ethicists' arguments range from justification of infanticide to reverence for all
human life no matter what the cost. Somewhere in the middle lie those who believe that
an ultimate decision on how far medicine morally must go to keep an infant alive is not
required. They argue that the question is not what is the ultimate answer, but rather,
who is most qualified to make the decision. The underlying assumption is that the
parents are not always acting in the child's best interest and, therefore, deference to
their decision is unwarranted. The important element is that an infant's disability should
not determine whether treatment is given. The child's potential for independence has no
place in a decision to provide treatment because the potential of any infant is unknown
at birth. The only relevant factors to a decision should be the risk of treatment and the
futility of treatments which will not correct all of the life-threatening conditions. Com-
pare H. KuHsE & P. SINGER, SHOULD THE BABY LivE? (1985) (advocating humane ways
of ending life) with Kravitz, Rabbinic Comment: The Infant With Severe Anomalies:
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medical,' legal, 6 and political' dialogue about who should decide
whether life-saving treatments will be given to severely compro-
mised infants, Many people were outraged8 when they learned that
a Down's syndrome9 child with a surgically correctable condition t"
Should Life-Saving Surgery be Performed?, 51 MOUNT SINAI J. MED. 34 (1984) (dis-
cussing the moral duty to preserve life).
I The medical community was largely opposed to government intervention into
the physician/patient relationship. See Strain, The American Academy of Pediatrics
Comments on the "Baby Doe 11" Regulations, 309 NEW ENG. J. MED. 443 (1983).
Some doctors, however, wrote that physicians should adopt their own review mechanism
even if the Baby Doe rules failed:
There can be little doubt that the majority of professionals involved
in newborn intensive care strongly disagree with the present administra-
tion's views on how to ensure optimal care to handicapped and critically
ill newborns .... Nevertheless, we would maintain that there is much to
be said in favor of what the Baby Doe regulation has accomplished within
the medical profession.
[This] regulation has markedly advanced interest in alternative advocacy
processes, specifically the development of infant bioethical review commit-
tees ....
Johnson & Thompson, The "Baby Doe" Rule: Is it All Bad?, 73 PEDIATRICS 729, 729
(1984).
6 See generally A, HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES IN PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MEDICINE
110-17 (1985) (excellent discussion of potential legal liabilities of doctors who care for
critically ill children); Annas, Baby Doe Redux: Doctors as Child Abusers, HASTINGS CENTER
L. REP., Oct. 1983, at 26 (criticizing Baby Doe regulations); OaRELa, The Forgotten Rights
of Defective Newborns, 1 HIAmT MATRix 59 (1983) (advocating an eight-step decision pro-
cedure to protect the rights of handicapped newborns); TURNBUtLL, Fundamental Rights,
Section 504, and Baby Doe, 1983 MENTAL RETARDATION 218 (rejecting the proposition that
parental authority should always be superior in treatment decisions).
7 See Mnookin, Two Puzzles, 1984 ARiz. ST. L.J. 667, 675-77.
S "Right-to-life groups, those concerned with human rights in general, and those
involved with rights of the handicapped in particular, expressed strong disapproval."
Comment, supra note 2, at 892 (footnotes omitted).
9 Down's syndrome is a form of mental retardation occuring in approximately
one out of 700 live births. The severity of the retardation cannot be determined at birth.
Often the condition is accompanied by congenital heart defects and gastrointestinal
blockage. The gastrointestinal physical defects are usually surgically correctable. See
Comment, supra note 2, at 889-90 nn.3-4.
10 Infant Doe was delivered by Dr. Walter Owens, an obstetrician with
privileges at Bloomington Hospital. Dr. Paul Wenzler, a general practi-
tioner who had been the family physician for the parents, was the infant's
initial attending physician. Both Dr. Owens and Dr. Wenzler tentatively
diagnosed Down's syndrome, and Dr. Wenzler requested a consultation
from Dr. James Schaffer, a pediatrician at Bloomington Hospital, who
agreed with the Down's syndrome diagnosis and also believed that the
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was permitted to die because his parents decided to forego
necessary life-saving treatment." The White House responded' 2
by directing the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS)
to remind federally assisted hospitals that they are prohibited by
infant had tracheoesophageal fistula, a developmental anomaly character-
ized by an abnormal connection between the trachea and the esophagus
resulting in the inability of food and fluids to pass from the mouth to the
stomach. Dr. Wenzler and Dr. Schaffer recommended that Infant Doe be
transferred immediately to ... the designated neonatal high risk center,
where necessary surgery to correct the tracheoesophageal fistula could be
performed. A fourth doctor, Dr. James Laughlin, also a pediatrician on
taff at Bloomington Hospital, examined Infant Doe and agreed with the
dia,-nosis already made. He expressly noted, however, "There is clinically
no evidence of other congenital anomalies. Further work-up work will be
necessary to confirm internal organ defects." He agreed with the recom-
mendation of Dr. Wenzler and Dr. Schaffer that the infant be transferred
immediately for surgery to correct the esophageal atresia.
Marzen v. United States Dep't. of Health and Human Serv's., 632 F. Supp. 785, 788
(N.D. Ill. 1986).
See Comment, supra note 2, at 890-91.
'2 See id. at 892. On June 16, 1982, the following notice appeared in the Federal
Register:
There has recently been heightened public concern about the adequacy
of medical treatment of newborn infants with birth defects. Reports suggest
that operable defects have sometimes not been treated, and instead infants
have been allowed to die, because of the existence of a concurrent handicap,
such as Down's syndrome.
We recognize that recipients of federal financial assistance may not
have full control over the treatment of handicapped patients when, for
instance, parental consent has been refused. Nevertheless, a recipient may
not aid or perpetuate discrimination by significantly assisting the discrim-
inatory actions of another person or organization. ...
In fulfilling its responsibilities, a federally assisted health care provider
should review its conduct in the following areas to insure that it is not
engaging in or facilitating discriminatory practices:
Counseling of parents should not discriminate by encouraging
parents to make decisions which, if made by the health care provider,
would be discriminatory under section 504.
Health care providers should not aid a decision by the infant's
parents or guardian to withhold treatment or nourishment discrimina-
torily by allowing the infant to remain in the institution.
Health care providers are responsible for the conduct of physicians
with respect to cases administered through their facilities.
The failure of a recipient of Federal financial assistance to comply
with the requirements of section 504 subjects that recipient to possible
termination of Federal assistance.
47 Fed. Reg. 26,027 (1982).
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section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 197313 from discrimi-
nating against handicapped persons. Section 504 provides that
"[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United
States . . shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination u.ader any program or activity re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance. 14
The Secretary responded by promulgating a rule requiring
federally assisted hospitals to post a sign in maternity and pe-
diatric wards. 5 The sign warned providers that "failure to feed
and care for handicapped infants .. . is prohibited by federal
law."' 16 The notice also provided the telephone number of the
Handicapped Infant Hotline. 7 Hospitals and physicians immediate-
ly voiced opposition to the government's interference in treatment
recommendations.' 8
The American Academy of Pediatrics brought suit to have
the rule declared invalid. 19 In American Academy of Pediatrics
v. Heckler,20 the rule was declared invalid because it was not
promulgated in accordance with the procedural requirements of
the Administrative Procedure Act.2 1
Subsequently, the Secretary of HHS promulgated new rules.?
These were challenged and ultimately reviewed by the United
States Supreme Court in Bowen v. American Hospital Associa-
tion.23 Although the case was decided on administrative law
grounds, 24 the Supreme Court noted that child welfare decisions
"1 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
14 Id.
11 Interim Final Rule, 48 Fed. Reg. 9630, 9631 (1983).
16 Id.
1 Id.
11 Mathieu, The Baby Doe Controversy, 1984 A=z. ST. L.J. 605, 607-11.
11 American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395 (D. D.C. 1983).
2 Id.
21 Id. at 401.
- 45 C.F.R. § 84.55 (1985).
106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986).
2 The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's finding that the challenged
"Baby Doe" regulations were outside the statutory authority of § 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973. Id. at 2123. Therefore, they were invalid under the Administrative
Procedure Act, § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (1982).
[Vol. 75
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traditionally have been made by parents and regulated by states. 25
Because the Court was unable to find that Congress intended
for section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 197326 to cover
medical treatment of handicapped infants, the challenged regu-
lations were held invalid.27
While the courts were struggling to interpret the scope of
section 504, Congress made a clear showing of its intent to
protect the rights of handicapped newborns in the Child Abuse
Amendments of 1984. 28 Because these amendments were not in
issue in the American Hospital Association case, 29 clarification
of the current federal policy regarding treatment of handicapped
newborns is needed.
This Comment attempts to reconcile the conflicting messages
from the Supreme Court" and Congress,31 to define the impact
of federal policy on the states' abuse laws, 32.and to explain the
decisional model which now replaces the traditional model of
deference to parents and non-intervention.3 3 The new decisional
model puts the duty to review cases of treatment withholding
on state child welfare agencies.3 4 These agencies will be required
to seek court orders to override parental choice in cases where
the infant has a life-threatening yet correctable condition. 5 This
shift in the law is long overdue. It will undoubtedly be difficult
for judges to order treatment of a child knowing that the child
may be rejected by his or her natural parents. Requiring this
decision, however, seems no more disturbing than sanctioning
the parents' decision to allow their child to die.
Id. at 2113 n.13 (quoting REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE
STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH
212-14 (1983) (footnotes omitted)).
See supra note 13.
106 S. Ct. at 2123.
28 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5103 (1982), as amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101(b)(6)-(7),
(c), (e); 5102(1)-(2); 5103(b)(2)(E), (I)-(K), (b)(3)-(4), (c)-(f) (Supp. III 1985).
See 106 S. Ct. 2101.
See infra notes 57-75 and accompanying text.
3' See infra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 101-116 and accompanying text.
- 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14(h) (1985).
75 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(c)(4)(ii) (1985).
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I. FEDERAL INITIATIVES TO PROTECT "BABY DOE": Two
ATTEMPTS
A. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
One of the implementing regulations36 under section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 197337 gives the Secretary of HHS
access to records of hospitals receiving federal financial assist-
ance to determine compliance with the Act.38 In October, 1983,
the Secretary learned that University Hospital of the State Uni-
versity of New York at Stony Brook was allegedly withholding
treatment from a handicapped infant.3 9 The Secretary "repeat-
edly requested that the University Hospital ... provide the
Department with access to all of Baby Jane Doe's medical rec-
ords. "40 When the- hospital refused to release the records, the
Secretary brought an enforcement action in federal district court.
41
The court granted summary judgment for University Hospital
on the grounds that the Secretary's authority to access records
is limited to situations in which he can clearly demonstrate
discriminatory action by the recipient hospital. 42 The court found
that the failure to perform surgery was due to the lack of
parental consent which by law prohibited the hospital from
performing the surgery. 43 This decision was appealed to the
Second Circuit. 44
On appeal, the issue in University Hospital was the authority
of the Secretary's request for patient records to determine whether
or not the hospital was in compliance with section 504.45 The
45 C.F.R. § 80.6(c) (1982) (incorporated by 45 C.F.R. § 84.61 (1982)).
3, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
3- 45 C.F.R. § 80.6(c).
11 United States v. Univ. Hosp. of State Univ. of N.Y., 575 F. Supp. 607, 611
(1983).
40 575 F. Supp. at 611.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 614.
43 Id.
" United States v. University Hosp., State Univ. of N.Y. at Stony Brook, 729
F.2d 144 (1984).
41 729 F.2d at 146. The Secretary was informed that the hospital may have been
discriminatorily withholding treatment from an infant known as Jane Doe. Id. at 147.
The Secretary requested access to the records under his general power to investigate to
[Vol. 75
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court reviewed the legislative history of section 504 and found
that Congress did not intend for it to apply to medical treatment
decisions. 46 The court stated, "[W]e cannot presume that by
enacting section 504, congress (sic) intended the federal govern-
ment to enter the field of child care, which, as HHS has recently
acknowledged, has traditionally been occupied by the states....
Had congress (sic) intended to displace state policy functions, it
surely would have made that intention explicit." 47 The sweeping
language of this opinion sounded the death knell for the final
"Baby Doe" rules4 which had been promulgated just six weeks
earlier.49
The final "Baby Doe" rules were promulgated in January
of 1984.0 In a consolidated case, American Hospital Association
insure compliance with § 504 under 45 C.F.R. § 80.6(c) as incorporated by 45 C.F.R.
84.61. Id. at 147-48. In the interim, the Secretary referred the complaint to the state
protection agency for investigation which found no cause for intervention. Id. at 147.
Prior to HHS involvement, a state action seeking a treatment order was brought by a
private party on behalf of Infant Jane Doe. Id. at 146. The New York Court of Appeals
held that the trial court had abused its discretion by allowing the individual to bring the
action without referring the matter to the state protection agency. Id. at 147. (The New
York Court of Appeals decision is In re William E. Weber, Guardian ad Litem for
Baby Jane Doe v. Stony Brook Hosp. et. al., 456 N.E.2d 1186 (N.V. 1983)).
I Id. at 154-60.
Id. at 160.
" See infra note 50.
The rules were published in January, 1984. The Second Circuit's opinion in
University Hospital was decided February 23, 1984.
- 49 Fed. Reg. 1622 (1984) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.55(a)-(f) (1984)). Section
84.55(a) encouraged hospitals to develop an Infant Care Review Committee [hereinafter
ICRC]. These review committees, it was hoped, would develop policies which would
insure that handicapped infants received appropriate treatment. Section 84.55(f) proposed
a model ICRC which could be followed by those who established an ICRC. Because
these were optional rules, they were not challenged in the subsequent litigation on this
issue. See infra notes 52 & 57-70 and accompanying text. Sections 84.55(b)-(e) were
mandatory and immediately challenged. Id. Section 84.55(b) required hospitals to post
a sign warning that federal law prohibited discriminatory treatment of handicapped
infants. The sign had to include the telephone number of the local protection agency
and the department of Health and Human Services [hereinafter HHS]. The signs were
to be posted where hospital personnel providing health care to infants could see them.
Section 84.55(c) required state protection teams to establish review procedures for
referrals of suspected medical neglect. Further, it required that state agencies require
health care providers to report instances of suspected medical neglect. Section 84.55(d)
gave HHS the authority to demand access to medical records at any time of the day or
night. Section 84.55(e) dispenses with the requirement of § 80.8(d)(3) of giving notice
before initiating an action to order compliance, where such action is necessary to protect
the life of a handicapped infant.
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v. Heckler,- both the American Hospital Association and the
American Medical Association challenged the authority of the
Secretary of HHS to promulgate these regulations under section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.52 Relying on the Second
Circuit's decision in United States v. University Hospital,3 the
district court granted summary judgment for the American Hos-
pital Association. 4 The court held that the final "Baby Doe" rules
were "invalid, unlawful and must be set aside pursuant to the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act ... because promulgated without
statutory authority. '55
American Hospital Association was appealed directly to the
United States Supreme Court.5 6 The Secretary also requested the
Court to review the Second Circuit's decision in University Hos-
pital.5 7 The Supreme Court affirmed American Hospital Asso-
ciation in a somewhat confusing plurality opinion. 5 The dissent
argued that the plurality failed to address the issue of whether
the Secretary of HHS has any authority under section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act "to regulate treatment decisions concern-
ing handicapped newborn infants." 59
One possible conclusion generated by the plurality's affir-
mation of the court of appeals' decision is that the Secretary is
enjoined from taking any action to investigate or regulate treat-
ment decisions of handicapped newborns under section 504.0 A
close reading of the opinion, however, casts doubts on such an
expansive interpretation. 6' The plurality specifically found that
S1 585 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986).
52 Id. (Secretary Heckler was replaced by Dr. Bowen during the litigation.).
11 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984).
585 F. Supp. at 542.
55 Id.
16 Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986).
Id. at 2109.
Id. at 2101.
59 Id. at 2123 (white, J., dissenting).
60 See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
61 106 S. Ct. at 2111-12 n.11. The plurality said, "This suit is not an enforcement
action, and as a consequence it is not necessary to determine whether § 504 ever applies
to individual medical treatment decisions involving handicapped infants." Id. at 2111.
The confusion lies in the Court's apparent affirmation of the Second Circuit's holding
that the Secretary had no authority under § 504 to regulate infant treatment decisions.
See id. at 2123-25 (White, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 75
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the challenged final rules62 were invalid.63 The plurality's ration-
ale was that parents, not hospitals, were withholding medically
indicated treatment. 64
The plurality found numerous proof failures in the admin-
istrative record65 First, the Secretary failed to show "that a
hospital failed or refused to provide treatment to a handicapped
infant for which parental consent had been given." 66 Second,
there was no proof that hospitals discriminatorily reported pa-
rental refusal to treat normal but not handicapped infants to the
appropriate state protection agency.67 Third, no evidence "that
physicians' predispositions against treating handicapped infants
had resulted in parental refusals to consent to treatment" was
present .6  Because the Secretary failed to prove that discrimina-
tory failure to treat was an actual problem, the Court found the
rules to be invalid:6 9 "In sum, there is nothing in the adminis-
trative record to justify the Secretary's belief that 'discriminatory
withholding of medical care' in violation of § 504 provides any
support for federal regulation .... -70
The plurality seems to invalidate the regulations simply be-
cause the Secretary was unable to demonstrate a clear need for
government intervention. The plurality does not say specifically
that the Secretary would never be authorized under section 504
to promulgate rules to prevent discriminatory treatment of hand-
icapped infants. 71 As Justice White said in his dissent, the deci-
sion "[g]ives no guidance to the Secretary or the other parties
as to the proper construction of the governing statute, and fails
(2 See supra note 50.
" 106 S. Ct. at 2120-23.
Id. at 2115.
" "The administrative record does not contain the reasoning and evidence that is
necessary to sustain federal intervention into a historically state-administered decisional
process that appears-for lack of any evidence to the contrary-to be functioning in
full compliance with § 504." Id. at 2122.
Id. at 2116.
Id. at 2118. However, the plurality said, "Of course, § 504 would be violated
only if the hospital failed to report medical neglect of a handicapped infant when it
would report such neglect of a similarly situated nonhandicapped infant." Id. at n.23.
I d. at n.22.
" Id. at 2123.
Id. at 2117.
Id. at 2118 n.23.
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adequately to explain the precise scope of the holding . ... "'
Arguably, the plurality decision invalidates only the four
challenged rules73 and leaves room for future regulation of infant
care decisions. Hopefully this means that the Court has left open
the possibility for future regulations under section 504.74 There-
fore, the American Hospital Association decision notwithstand-
ing, 75 section 50476 remains a valid mechanism for insuring that
handicapped newborns are accorded nondiscriminatory treat-
ment.
B. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984
In response to publicity surrounding parental decisions to
withhold treatment from handicapped infants in 198 7 and in
1982,78 the Child Abuse Amendments of 198479 included "failure
to treat a handicapped infant" within the meaning of child abuse
and neglect.80 The Senate Report" clearly indicates that federal
policy in this area prohibits withholding medically indicated8 2
72 Id. at 2132 (White, J., dissenting).
13 See supra note 50.
74 See infra text accompanying notes 98-99.
7S 106 S. Ct. 2101.
76 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
"In May, 1981, a decision was made to withhold treatment from handicapped
Siamese twins born in Danville, Illinois. Intervention by authorities resulted in a widely
publicized custody battle and the filing of criminal charges against the attending physi-
cians and the parents." SENATE Comm. ON LABOR AND HumAN REsouRcEs, CHILD ABuSE
AMENDMENTS OF 1984, S. REP. No. 246, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMAN. NEws 2918, 2922.
78
In early April, 1982, a handicapped child, known to the public as "Infant
Doe," was born .... The parents ... made the decision to withhold
medical treatment and nourishment from the child .... State and local
courts approved the withholding of treatment and nourishment, and the
infant died six days after birth while attorneys on behalf of the infant were
preparing an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Id.
79 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5103 (Supp. III. 1985).
0 Id.
SI See supra note 77.
92
Let me stress here that some problems are simply not correctable. Some
handicapped infants, unfortunately, face imminent death. For such infants
it is very important to note that we do not seek to fruitlessly prolong the
BABY DOE
treatment from disabled newborns regardless of who makes the
decision. The report states:
Under the fundamental tenets of our society, the life of
an able-bodied or disabled human being should not be brought
to a premature end by parental, physician, or hospital com-
mittee decree. Where death is imminent and inevitable, and
where medical intervention merely forestalls the inevitable, this
Committee acknowledges that refraining from medical inter-
vention may be an ethically and legally acceptable course.
Where death is avoidable through surgical and other therapeu-
tic means that customarily are provided to non-disabled chil-
dren, however, the denial of such treatment is clearly abusive
to children and is a violation of the disabled child's most
fundamental rights.
Although the witnesses who testified before the subcom-
mittee differed markedly in their views as to the appropriate
response to instances of withholding treatment from severely
handicapped infants, all agreed that there is a sufficient body
of evidence that such cases do occur and that it is an issue
that needs greater scrutiny and remedial action .8
The Act gives the Secretary of HHS the authority to pro-
mulgate implementing rules.84 Final rules, published in April,
1985, require states to adopt certain definitions and procedures
within their child abuse statutes to receive grants from the federal
government." The states are required to include "medical
neglect ' 8 6 within their definition of child abuse. 87 The rules
define "medical neglect . . . [as] failure to provide adequate
medical care"' 8 which "includes, but is not limited to, the with-
process of dying, rather, we seek to guarantee that infants who would live,
given ordinary care, will not be denied the opportunity for life by those
who would decide that their lives are not worth living.
S. REP. No. 246, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADnw.
NEws 2918, 2926 (quoting Dr. Everett Koop's testimony before the Subcommittee on
Family and Human Senices).
' Id. at 2928.
42 U.S.C. § 5102(1) (Supp. III 1985).
' 50 Fed. Reg. 14,887 (1985) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1340).
45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(b)(1) (1985).
45 C.F.R. § 1340.14(b) (1985).
F 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(b)(1).
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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
holding of medically indicated treatment from a disabled infant
with a life-threatening condition."89
The term, "withholding of medically indicated treatment" 0
is defined as:
the failure to respond to the infant's life-threatening conditions
by providing treatment (including appropriate nutrition, hydra-
tion, and medication) which, in the treating physician's ...
reasonable medical judgment, will be most likely to be effective
in ameliorating or correcting all such conditions, except that the
term does not include the failure to provide treatment (other than
appropriate nutrition, hydration, or medication) to an infant
when, in the treating physician's... reasonable medical judg-
ment, (A) The infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose;
(B) The provision of such treatment would merely prolong dy-
ing, not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the in-
fant's life-threatening conditions, or otherwise be futile in terms
of the survival of the infant; or (C) The provision of such treat-
ment would be virtually futile in terms of the survival of the in-
fant and the treatment itself under the circumstances would be
inhumane.9'
Further, the regulations require states to establish an appro-
priate mechanism for responding to instances of suspected med-
ical neglect. 92 The rules require each state to submit the grant
application to HHS with "sufficient information and documen-
tation to permit the Commissioner to find that the State is in
compliance with the eligibility requirements" 93 set forth in the
final rules. 94
The full impact of these regulations upon treatment decisions
is yet unknown. Congress, however, clearly intended the Child
Abuse Amendments to prohibit the withholding of life-saving
treatment from disabled infants, regardless of who makes the
decision. Because the plurality in American Hospital Association95
$9 Id.
- 42 U.S.C. § 5102(3) (Supp. III 1985).
9' Id.
'z 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(c)(1)-(5).
93 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(d)(1).
-4 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(c)(1)-(5).
' 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986).
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was influenced by the lack of legislative history to support the
Secretary's action,96 a similar decision probably would not be
rendered in an attack on the final rules implementing the Child
Abuse Amendments. 97 Moreover, the plurality found that the
Secretary failed to prove that hospitals were withholding treat-
ment after parental consent had been given.98 This implies that,
unless the Secretary is able to show proof of an institutional
bias that results in differential medical treatment of handicapped
and nonhandicapped infants, section 504 will not be applicable
to infant treatment decisions. The plurality noted that parents
were withholding treatment and private conduct is not within
the purview of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.99 In con-
trast, private conduct is regulated specifically under the Child
Abuse Amendment of 1984.100 Therefore, the amendments insure
that the state's welfare agency will review all decisions to forego
treatment. This should achieve the desirable result of saving the
lives of infants who have medically correctable, life-threatening
conditions.
II. THE STATE'S ROLE AS DECISIONMAKER FOR HANDICAPPED
INFANTS
Complete understanding of the impact of the Child Abuse
Amendments of 1984101 requires a review of the state's historical
role in treatment decisions. Every state has a law that prohibits
child abuse and neglect, 02 mandating that physicians report child
Id. at 2122 n.33.
See, e.g., S. REP. No. 246, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONo. & AD uN. NEws 2918-2928.
See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5103 (Supp. III 1985). See supra note 83 and accompanying
text. Child abuse laws are based on the assumption that the parents' right to make
decisions for their child is not absolute. The state has an interest in protecting a child
when his or her parents have failed to act in the child's best interest. The effect of these
amendments is to include review of parental choices of medical treatment for their
handicapped infant within the state's authority.
42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5103 (Supp. III 1985).
I. SLOAN, CHILD ABUSE: GOVERNING LAWS & LEGISLATION 15 (1983).
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abuse. 03 All fifty states provide for immunity from civil or
criminal action for persons making a report.' 4 The definitions
of child abuse or neglect vary from state to state. 05
Even with reporting mechanisms in place, however, states
traditionally have not interfered with parental decisions concern-
ing treatment of newborns. 06 Perhaps this non-interference re-
sulted because physicians rarely sought to use the mechanism to
obtain a court order to treat a handicapped infant1 °7 Further-
103 Id. at 22. The extent to which the statutory duty to report gives rise to civil or
criminal liability is unknown. Generally, prosecutors do not file charges for failure to
report cases of abuse. In Landeros v. Flood, 551 P.2d 389 (Cal. 1976), the court held
that, if the plaintiff could prove that the physician actually saw the injuries and formed
the opinion that they were intentionally inflicted, a prima facie case of negligence would
be shown through violation of statute. Id. at 143.
104 Id. at 31.
1*1 Id. at 18-22. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2801(B) (Supp. 1980) ("Any person
commits cruelty to children when he maliciously causes a child under the age of 18 cruel
or excessive physical or mental pain.") (reprinted in I. SwOAN, PROTECTION OF ABUSED VIC-
Tims: STATE LAWS & DECISIONS pt. 5, at 7 (1983)) with Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.011(6)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982) [hereinafter KRS].
"Abused or neglected child" means a child whose health or welfare is
harmed or threatened with harm when his parent, guardian or any other
person[:] ... inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the child, physical or
mental injury to the child by other than accidental means; creates or allows
to be created a risk of physical or mental injury to the child by other than
accidental means; ... does not provide the child with adequate care and
supervision; food, clothing and shelter; education; or medical care neces-
sary for the child's well-being ....
Id.
106 See, e.g., American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.
D.C. 1983). Judge Gesell, writing for the court, said, "Traditionally, the difficult
decision of when to withhold life-sustaining treatment of a defective newborn has been
one made within the privacy of the physician-patient relationship .... Physicians ...
frequently give great deference to the wishes of the parents who are considered guardians
of the best interests of the child." Id. at 396. For an interesting article arguing against
state intrusion into the parent's decision, see Note, Life or Death in the Intensive Care
Nursery: Who Should Decide? 11 Wm. MrTCHELL L. REv. 127 (1985).
107
A great number of the physicians ... felt that what might be a poor
quality of life, in their estimation, was sufficient reason not to treat a
child for a defect which may have been incompatible with life but never-
theless amendable to surgical correction. Only three percent of pediatric
surgeons and 16 percent of pediatricians would seek a court order for the
necessary surgery over the parents' objections, while 78 percent and 88
percent, respectively, would do so if the young child were not disabled but
in need of cancer surgery.
S. REP. No. 246, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmIN.
NEws 2918, 2925 (summarizing a survey of physicians conducted in 1975).
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more, when physicians have notified the appropriate protection
agency, the parents' decision has been upheld as within the
parents' right to choose between reasonable medical alterna-
tives. 101 When court orders have been sought, courts often have
denied the motions because the common law viewed parents as
the best decision-makers for their minor child. 1°9 The common
law appears to be out of step with prevailing beliefs and federal
policy in light of the public and political outrage to the Infant
Doe situation. 10
The impact of the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984"' and
their implementing regulations 12 is procedural. The amendments
require states to incorporate a number of safeguards within their
child abuse statutes. The amendments are designed to insure that
parental decisions to withhold consent for treatment will be
reviewed and sometimes reversed. The states must incorporate
the term "medical neglect '"" 3 within their child abuse statutes."
4
Once the definition is incorporated, physicians will have a sta-
tutory duty to report parental refusal of consent to treatments
which are "most likely to be effective in ameliorating or cor-
recting all [life-threatening] conditions .. ,,1. 5 Thus, the tradi-
tional approach of allowing parents and physicians" 6 to be the
final arbiters in decisions to forego treatment must be rejected
by the reviewing court and state protection agency.
CONCLUSION
The federal government continues to play an important role
in prohibiting discriminatory treatment of handicapped chil-
l' The extreme example of this is in the case of Infant Doe of Bloomington, in
which denial of food and water was considered a reasonable medical alternative. See
Comment, supra note 2, at 890.
" Id. at 891, 894 n.29.
See id. at 890.
42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5103 (Supp. III 1985).
1 42 C.F.R. § 1340 (1985).
"' 42 C.F.R. § 1340.15(b)(1) (1985).
42 C.F.R. § 1340.2(d) (1985).
". 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(b)(2) (1985). For the parameters of those decisions to forego
treatment which constitute abuse, see supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
H. See, e.g., supra note 106.
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dren. 117 Ironically, the impetus has come from the Child Abuse
Amendments of 1984118 rather than from section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act" 9 which was patterned after the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.120 Fortunately, the impact on the parents' right to
be the decision-makers 2' for their child is far more extensive
than could have been achieved under the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.122
The full impact of the Child Abuse Amendments on "Baby
Doe" situations will be determined by future judicial interpre-
tations. State protection agencies and courts will have to wrestle
with the difficult ethical decisions in the hard cases in which the
therapeutic value of surgery is marginal. The courts now have
statutory authority'2 to justify, and interpretive guidelines 124 to
aid, the making of decisions to override the parents' choice to
withhold treatment. Understanding the history of the "Baby
"I See Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C. § 1401
(1982) (assures free and appropriate access to public education for handicapped children
ages 3-21); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) (providing nondiscrimi-
natory access to all programs which receive federal financial assistance); Developmental
Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6010(1), (2) (1982)
(insuring the right of developmentally disabled persons to receive appropriate treatment
and services in the least restrictive environment).
118 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5103 (Supp. III 1985).
119 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). See supra note 13.
120 Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1982). "No person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id. See generally R. ScorcH,
FRoM GOOD WLL TO CiviL RiGrs (1984) (an excellent comparison of the Civil Rights
Act § 601 and the Rehabilitation Act § 504).
121 Mathieu, supra note 18, at 608 n.10.
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). Section 504, by definition, is limited to prohibiting
discriminatory treatment by programs that receive federal funds. Id. Therefore, parents
are not prohibited by the act from taking into account their child's handicap when
making a treatment decision. However, the Child Abuse Amendments define failure to
treat as child abuse. 42 U.S.C. § 5102 (Supp, III 1985). Thus, the abusing parents'
rights are no longer relevant.
'2 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5103 (Supp. III 1985). To date, 47 states and the District of
Columbia are known to be in compliance with the regulations implementing the Child
Abuse Amendments. The three remaining states did not apply for grants from the federal
government this year. Telephone interview with J. Olson, Program Specialist, National
Center on Child Abuse and Neglect (NCCAN), (Oct. 16, 1986).
114 Appendix to Part 1340-Interpretive Guidelines Regarding 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15-
Services and Treatment for Disabled Infants, 45 C.F.R. Ch. XIII, 213-20 (1985).
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Doe" controversy and what the outcome says of our society's
commitment to the sanctity of life should serve as guidelines for
courts. As Justice Marshall wrote,
[S]hifting cultural, political, and social patterns at times come
to make past practices appear inconsistent with fundamental
principles upon which American society rests. . . .It is natural
that evolving standards of equality come to be embodied in
legislation, when that occurs, courts should look to the fact
of such change as a source of guidance on evolving principles
of equality .... 21
Society has an interest in protecting the rights of disabled
infants. No longer can physicians and parents choose nontreat-
ment of a correctable condition because the child has limited
potential, without being held accountable for their decision.
They would do well to take Justice Marshall's advice and review
the "Baby Doe" controversy for guidance in making future
treatment decisions.
Mary Ann Born
-2 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3269 (1985)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
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